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Abstract
The Nash equilibrium concept combines two fundamental ideas. First, rational play-
ers choose the most preferred strategy given their beliefs about what other players will
do. Second, it imposes the consistency condition that all players’ beliefs are correct.
This consistency condition has often been considered too strong and different solution
concepts have been introduced in the literature in order to take into account ambiguous
beliefs. In this paper, we show, by means of examples, that in some situation beliefs
might be dependent on the strategy profile and that this kind of contingent ambiguity
affects equilibrium behavior differently with respect to the existing models of ambiguous
games. Hence we consider a multiple prior approach and subjective beliefs correspon-
dences which represent an exogenous ability of each player to put restrictions on beliefs
over outcomes consistently with the strategy profile; we investigate existence of the
equilibrium concepts corresponding to different attitudes towards ambiguity (namely
optimism and pessimism). Finally we analyze particular beliefs correspondences: beliefs
given by correlated equilibria and by ambiguity levels on events.
Keywords: Noncooperative games, ambiguity, beliefs correspondence, equilibrium
1 Introduction
In the theory of decision making under uncertainty actions of decision makers are usually as-
sumed to lead to well-defined probability distributions over outcomes, meaning that choices of
actions could be identified with choices of probability distributions. The subjective expected
utility theory (Savage (1954)) provides a strongly founded approach for ranking probability
distributions over outcomes for decision-makers endowed with subjective risk preferences.
While this approach has led to many theoretical achievements in economics over the past
decades, the evidence from Ellsberg (1961) suggests that beliefs cannot always be represented
1The authors would like to thank the partecipants to Workshop DYSES 2010, University of Sannio,
and Workshop on Equilibrium Analysis under Ambiguity 2011, University of Naples Federico II, for helpful
comments.
A previous version of this work circulated with the title Ambiguous Games with Contingent Beliefs.
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by conventional probabilities. Empirical research seems to confirm Ellsberg’s conjecture on
the inconsistencies between Savage’s theory and empirically observed behavior. In order
to fit these discrepancies, alternative theories have been proposed. The most known theo-
ries are the Choquet expected utility theory (henceforth CEU, see Schmeidler (1989)), which
involves individuals maximizing the expected value of an utility function with respect to non-
additive beliefs (capacities) by means of Choquet integrals (Choquet(1953)) and the maxmin
expected utility theory (henceforth MEU, see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) in which beliefs
are represented by a convex set of probability distributions over outcomes (multiple priors)
and individuals maximize the minimum over the set of beliefs of the corresponding expected
utilities. These theories and their extensions are known as ambiguity theory.
Part of the growing literature on ambiguity has focused in the last years on games with
players having ambiguous beliefs; in particular, the analysis has been directed to the concept
of Nash equilibrium. In fact, the Nash equilibrium concept combines two fundamental ideas:
First, rational players choose one of their most preferred strategies given their beliefs about
what other players will do. Second, it imposes the consistency condition that all players’
beliefs are correct. One of the major criticisms to the Nash equilibrium concept has always
been the strength of the consistency condition. In fact, in many settings it is not clear why
players should have exactly correct beliefs about each other. Therefore, different solution
concepts have been introduced in order to weaken such consistency condition by taking
into account ambiguous beliefs; most of such solution concept are founded on the MEU
approach (see for instance Lo (1996) and Klibanoff (1996)). In Dow and Werlang (1994),
Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), Eichberger, Kelsey and Schipper (2008) and in Marinacci
(2000) instead, the CEU approach has been taken into account. However, in all these papers
the set of beliefs of each player is fixed, while it can be exogenous or endogenously given
by the solution concept; moreover, ambiguity concerns only beliefs on opponents’ strategies.
Examples suggest, instead, that ambiguity may concern also the rules of the game and
that it may vary with the strategy profile; this is the case, for instance, of the models of
coalition formation investigated in De Marco and Romaniello (2010;a,b) in which ambiguity
concerns also the rules of coalition formation. More precisely, those papers extend previous
literature in which stability of coalition structures has been analyzed by using concepts of
equilibrium in associated strategic form games (see Hart and Kurz (1983)). In this class of
games the strategy set of each player i is the set of all subgroups of players containing i and
his choice represents the coalition he wishes to join. It is well known that, given a strategy
profile (i.e. a coalition for each player), the coalition structure formed is not unequivocally
determined since it depends on the so-called rules of coalition structure formation which are
functions associating to every strategy profile a coalition structure. The usual assumption
in this literature is that each player i makes his choice having correct beliefs about the
strategies of every other player and about the formation rule of coalitions in which i is not
involved. However, other literature argues that the formation of a coalition is the outcome
of private communication within the members of the coalition (see Moreno and Wooders
(1996) and references therein). Hence, differently from the previous literature, in De Marco
and Romaniello (2010;a,b) it has been considered the case in which each player has vague
expectations about the choices of his opponents corresponding to the coalitions in which is
not involved and about the formation rule of these coalitions. It is shown that the join of
those two different sources of ambiguity implies multiplicity of additive beliefs over outcomes,
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which turn also to be strategy profile dependent.
Therefore, in this paper we take into account a general setting in which the set of beliefs
over outcomes varies with the strategy profile. In particular, this model embodies ambiguity
about beliefs over opponents’ strategies and a class of incomplete information games with
multiple priors. We show, by means of examples, that slight variations to already existing
models give rise quite naturally to the “contingent ambiguity” we investigate in this work.
We follow the multiple prior approach: for each player, beliefs are given by a set-valued map
(correspondence) which provides a set of subjective additive beliefs (probability distribution)
over outcomes for every strategy profile. Such beliefs correspondences are exogenous and
represent the ability of each player to put restrictions on beliefs over outcomes consistently
with the strategy profile, in particular with correct beliefs over opponents’ behavior. In line
with the work of Marinacci (2000), ambiguity is solved by considering two different kind
of (extreme) attitudes towards ambiguity: pessimism and optimism. Players that, in the
presence of ambiguity, emphasize the lower payoffs are called pessimistic and players that
instead emphasize the higher ones are called optimistic. In fact, the emphasis on higher
and lower payoffs may be thought of as dependent on whether or not the player expects
that ambiguity will be resolved in his favor. We provide existence results for the equilibria
in games in which every player is optimistic or pessimistic. These results are based on the
topological properties of the belief correspondences. The last section of the paper analyzes
whether two specific kind of belief correspondence satisfy the requirements of the existence
results. In the first model, beliefs to a player over his opponents’ strategy profiles depend
only on his strategies: beliefs are given by the correlated equilibria of the game between
the opponents once they have observed players’ action. In the second model, beliefs are
determined by contingent assignment of ambiguity levels on a family of disjoint events in the
set of outcomes.
2 Illustrative Examples
As already mentioned in the Introduction and as it will be formally stated in the next section,
aim of this work is an equilibrium analysis in games in which players have ambiguous beliefs
over the outcomes of the game and ambiguous beliefs depend on the strategy profile. In
this section we give examples showing that this kind of ambiguous beliefs may arise quite
naturally in simple models and affect the equilibrium behavior differently with respect to the
already existing models of ambiguous beliefs.
In the first example, we revise the arguments contained in Marinacci (2000) regarding the
effects of ambiguity on equilibrium behavior in a variation of the stag hunt game, ambiguity
in this case concerns only beliefs over opponents strategies. The second example is devoted to
the equilibrium analysis in the noisy leader game (Bagwell (1982)) and, in this case, ambiguity
depends only on the incomplete information problem in presence of multiple priors. The third
example, the ambiguous formation game (De Marco and Romaniello (2010)), puts together
ambiguous beliefs over opponents’ strategies with ambiguous rules of the game. We emphasize
the the tree models can all be described by the general model presented in this paper.
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The stag hunt game
The stag hunt game consists in the following 2 player game:
c d
c 9, 9 0, 8
d 8, 0 7, 7
Call Alice the row player and Bob the column player. This game has two equilibria in pure
strategies: (c, c) which Pareto dominates the other equilibrium (d, d). However the strategy
(d, d) risk dominates (c, c)2.
Aumann (1990) argues that whenever players are prudent the equilibrium (c, c) cannot
be obtained even in case of pre-play communication:
”Let us now change the scenario by permitting pre-play communication. On the face of it, it
seems that the players can then agree to play (c, c); though the agreement is not enforceable,
it removes each player’s doubt about the other one playing c. But does it indeed remove this
doubt? Suppose that Alice (player 1) is a careful, prudent person, and in the absence of an
agreement, would play d. Suppose now that the players agree on (c, c), and each retires to
his corner in order actually to make a choice. Alice is about to choose c, when she says to
herself: Wait; I have a few minutes; let me think this over. Suppose that Bob doesn’t trust
me, and so will play d in spite of our agreement. Then he would still want me to play c,
because that way he will get 8 rather than 7. And of course, also if he does play c, it is better
for him that I play c. Thus he wants me to play c no matter what . . . it is as if there were
no agreement. So I will choose now what I would have chosen without an agreement, namely
d”.
Aumann (1990) points out that it is in a players interest to always signal c, regardless of
whatever strategy he actually intends to use, since each strictly prefers that the other play c.
He concludes that an agreement to play (c, c) conveys no information about what the players
will do, and cannot be considered self-enforcing.
Marinacci (2000) argues that the attitudes towards ambiguity of the player determine
whether (c, c) or (d, d) will be reached. More precisely, since there may be no obvious way
to play, agents might well have low confidence in their own beliefs about their opponent’s
behavior and the way they react to this kind of ambiguity plays a significative role. With
pessimistic players, (that is players that in the presence of ambiguity emphasize the lower
payoffs), and if ambiguity is sufficiently high then only (d, d) is an equilibrium. This latter
prediction accords with Aumann’s arguments. When players are optimistic, (that is, they
emphasize higher payoffs), and ambiguity is sufficiently high then the Pareto efficient Nash
equilibrium (c, c) can be implemented as the unique equilibrium in the ambiguous game.
2The strategy pair (d,d) risk dominates (c,c) if the product of the deviation losses is highest for (d,d)
(Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, Lemma 5.4.4). In other words, if the following inequality holds: (fA(c, d) −
fA(d, d))(fB(d, c) − fB(d, d)) > (fA(d, c) − fA(c, c))(fB(c, d) − fB(c, c)). Since the game is symmetric, the
inequality allows for a simple interpretation: assume the players are unsure about which strategy the opponent
will pick and assign probabilities 1/2 to c and d each. Since (d, d) risk dominates (c, c), then the expected
payoff from playing d exceeds the expected payoff from playing c, in fact Ei
(
d, 12c+
1
2d
)
= 152 >
9
2 =
Ei
(
c, 12c+
1
2d
)
.
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To understand better these arguments, consider the game in which players have multiple
priors3. For every i ∈ {A,B}, denote with Bi the set of beliefs of player i over the strategies
of his opponent, that is bi ∈ Bi denotes the probability of c and 1 − bi the probability of d.
For the sake of simplicity assume that Bi = [b, b] for i = 1, 2 and, for every bi ∈ Bi, the expect
payoffs from playing c or d are respectively Ei(c, bi) = 9bi and Ei(d, bi) = 8bi + 7(1 − bi).
Hence for an optimistic player i, the expect payoffs from playing c or d are respectively
max
bi∈Bi
Ei(c, bi) = 9b max
bi∈Bi
Ei(d, bi) = 8b+ 7(1− b)
while, for a pessimistic player i, the expect payoffs from playing c or d are respectively
min
bi∈Bi
Ei(c, bi) = 9b min
bi∈Bi
Ei(d, bi) = 8b+ 7(1− b).
Therefore, it follows that, for an optimistic player i, c is a best reply to Bi if and only if
9b ≥ 8b+ 7(1− b) ⇐⇒ b ≥ 7
8
and that, for a pessimistic player i, d is a best reply to Bi if and only if and only if
9b ≤ 8b+ 7(1− b) ⇐⇒ b ≤ 7
8
.
The key point of this analysis is that the the set of multiple priors is fixed (that is, it
does not depend on the strategy of each player). However, in such a context of vagueness,
it is possible that a player (say Alice) has so vague expectations that she believes that with
probability ε Bob will observe her action before choosing his strategy. Assuming that Alice
believes that Bob will react optimally once observed her action then, the beliefs of Alice over
Bob’s strategies become
BA(c) = (1− ε)BA + ε(bi = 1) = [(1− ε)b+ ε, (1− ε)b+ ε];
BA(d) = (1− ε)BA + ε(bA = 0) = [(1− ε)b, (1− ε)b]
hence the expected payoffs of an optimistic Alice are
max
bA∈BA(c)
EA(c, bA) = 9[(1− ε)b+ ε]; max
bA∈BA(d)
EA(d, bA) = 8[(1− ε)b] + 7[1− [(1− ε)b]]
while, for a pessimistic Alice we get
min
bA∈BA(c)
EA(c, bA) = 9[(1− ε)b+ ε]; min
bA∈BA(d)
EA(d, bA) = 8[(1− ε)b] + 7[1− [(1− ε)b]]
Analogous arguments can hold for Bob. Therefore, it can be checked that c is a best reply if
and only if b ≥ 7−8ε
8(1−ε) and d is a best reply if and only if b ≤ 7−8ε8(1−ε) . Since 7−8ε8(1−ε) < 78 . Hence,
these new beliefs imply that (c, c) requires a lower level of ambiguity to be implemented as an
equilibrium for optimistic players while the implementation of (d, d) requires more vagueness.
However, in this case there are no substantial differences with the analysis involving a fixed
set of beliefs. To better understand the impact of variable beliefs we need to consider a
variation of the stag hunt game:
3Marinacci (2000) considers instead capacities and the Choquet expected utility approach. However in
this example it is possible to obtain similar insights by considering the multiple priors approach.
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c d
c 8, 8 0, 8
d 8, 0 7, 7
This game has yet two equilibria (c, c) (which remains the unique strong Nash equilibrium)
and (d, d) which not only is risk dominant but it is also in weakly dominant strategies.
Obviously, (c, c) can be implemented by optimistic players in the game with fixed set of
beliefs only if such set is of the following kind Bi = [b, 1]. However, for the set of beliefs also
the Pareto dominated profile (d, d) is an equilibrium for optimistic players. However, the
introduction of variable beliefs allows for a resolution of this drawback. In fact, in this case
the beliefs correspondence are
BA(c) = (1− ε)BA + ε[0, 1] = [(1− ε)b+ ε, 1];
BA(d) = (1− ε)BA + ε(bA = 0) = [(1− ε)b, (1− ε)]
hence
max
bA∈BA(c)
EA(c, bA) = 8; max
bA∈BA(d)
EA(d, bA) = 8[(1− ε)] + 7[1− [(1− ε)]] = 8− ε
which implies that c is always the unique best reply and (c, c) the unique equilibrium for
optimistic players.
The noisy leader game
Consider a simple 2 x 2 setting in which there are two players who choose one of two actions,
C and S. If the game is played simultaneously, the payoff matrix is
S C
S 5, 2 3, 1
C 6, 3 4, 4
The (S, S) outcome is the “Stackelberg outcome” since this is the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome for the game in which player 1 moves first in a perfectly observable
fashion. The unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the simultaneous-move game is (C,C),
and this corresponds to the “Cournot outcome”. Bagwell (1982) then considers the noisy-
leader game. In this game, a pure strategy for player 1 is simply an action in the set {C, S}.
Let the signal received by player 2 be denoted by φ, and assume for simplicity that φ either
takes value C or S. The signal technology works as follows:
Prob(φ = S|S) = 1− ε = Prob(φ = C|C),
where ε ∈]0, 1[. In other words, when player 1 chooses a particular action, the probability that
player 2 will observe a signal specifying that same action is 1− ε. If a2 ∈ {C, S} represents
an action for player 2, then a pure strategy for player 2 is a function, a2 = ω(φ), where
ω(φ) ∈ {C, S} for all φ. The noisy-leader game admits no off-equilibrium-path information
sets, since, for any given action by Player 1, each signal is realized with positive probability.
Hence, backward-induction-based refinements of Nash equilibrium are not effective (helpful)
in this game and the equilibria can be found from the following strategic form:
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SS SC CS CC
S 5, 2 5− 2ε, 2− ε 3 + 2ε, 1 + ε 3, 1
C 6, 3 4 + 2ε, 4− ε 6− 2ε, 3− ε 4, 4
The Stackelberg outcome therefore fails to emerge as a Nash equilibrium outcome for the
noisy leader game, and this is true no matter how precise the signal may be (i.e., no matter
how small is ε). In fact, the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the noisy-leader game
occurs when player 1 selects C and player 2 also selects C for all signal values.
Now we look at the effects of ambiguity: suppose that the probability ε is vague and in
particular assume that it can be any probability in an interval [ε, ε]. It is easy to check that if
ε > 0 then only (C, (C,C)) is an equilibrium, independently from the attitudes of the players
towards ambiguity. Therefore, assume that ε = 0 implying that the signal might be precise.
If player 2 is pessimistic, then, again (C, (C,C)) is the unique equilibrium independently
from the attitudes of player 1 towards ambiguity. Suppose now that player 2 is optimistic,
then the payoff matrix becomes
SS SC CS CC
S 5, 2 5− 2ε, 2 3 + 2ε, 1 + ε 3, 1
C 6, 3 4 + 2ε, 4 6− 2ε, 3 4, 4
This game has at least another equilibrium in which player 2 chooses his strategy according
to the signal he receives, that is the equilibrium strategy of player 2 is (S,C). The best
reply of player 1 to player 2’s strategy (S,C) depends on the level of ambiguity of the signal
(ambiguity is larger as ε increases) and not on the attitude of player 1 towards ambiguity.
In fact, independently of his attitudes, when ε < 1/2 player 1 prefers S to C. Whenever
ε > 1/2 things are exactly the opposite since player 1 prefers C to S.
Therefore, vagueness on the technology of the signal and the presence of an optimistic
player 2 alters the scenario since it allows for the existence of other equilibria in which player
2 plays the strategy (S,C). Moreover, one can check that in those equilibria an optimistic
player 1 gets an expected payoff which is greater or equal than 5 which is the Stackelberg
outcome. This means that an optimistic attitude towards ambiguity restores the first mover
advantage.
Ambiguous coalition formation
In this subsection we present the ambiguous coalition formation model introduced and in-
vestigated in De Marco and Romaniello (2010). We focus only on the construction of the
beliefs correspondences, being the analysis of the equilibria already investigated in the paper
previously quoted.
Let I = {1, . . . , n} be a set of players, then a coalition structure is a partition pi of I, that is⋃
S∈pi
S = I, S ∩ T = ∅ ∀S, T ∈ pi
We denote with Π the set of all coalition structures. In Hart and Kurz (1983), it is presented
a game in which the strategy set of each agent i is Σi = {S ⊆ I | i ∈ S} and
∏
i∈I Σi = Σ;
a strategy profile is the n-tuple (S1, . . . , Sn) ∈ Σ, where the strategy Si represents the set of
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players that player i wishes to join; while the payoff fi of each player i depends on the way all
the players are partitioned in coalitions, i.e. fi : Π → R for each player i. Given a strategy
profile (i.e. a coalition for each player), the coalition structure formed is not unequivocally
determined. So, different rules of coalition structure formation can be considered, namely,
functions associating to every strategy profile a coalition structure. Hart and Kurz (1983)
proposed two models for coalition structures formation: the γ and the δ models. Here, we
focus only on the so called γ model in which a coalition S forms if and only if all its members
have chosen S; the rest of the players become singletons. More precisely the γ model is
defined by the function hγ :
∏
i∈I Σi → Π where
S ∈ hγ(S1, . . . , Sn) ⇐⇒ S = Sj ∀j ∈ S or S = {l}, l ∈ I.
Then, the game of coalition formation is
Γγ = {I; Σ1, . . . ,Σn; f1(hγ(·)), . . . , fn(hγ(·))}.
Therefore the classical equilibrium concepts in the game Γγ imply that each player has correct
beliefs over strategies and perfect knowledge of the coalition formation rule. However, previ-
ous literature on coalition formation considers the formation of a coalition as the outcome of
private agreements within the members of the coalition (see Moreno and Wooders (1996)).
Following this idea, we focus on the case in which each player has ambiguous expectations
on the choices of his opponents corresponding to the coalitions in which is not involved and
about the formation rules of such coalitions.
More precisely, every player i is allowed to choose a mixed strategy, called mixed coalition,
i.e. a vector of probabilities mi = (mi,S)S3i such that mi,S ≥ 0 for every S containing i and∑
S3imi,S = 1. We denote the set of mixed strategies of player i with ∆i. Players’ beliefs are
expressed by coalition structure beliefs where a coalition structure belief is a probability dis-
tribution on Π, that is a vector % = (%pi)pi∈Π such that %pi ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ Π and
∑
pi∈Π %pi = 1;
∆Π denotes the set of all coalition structure beliefs. Since a coalition S can be regarded as
an event in Π:
ES = {pi ∈ Π | S ∈ pi},
then each family (ES)S∈Σi is a partition of Π.
Therefore, given m = (m1, . . . ,mn), we assume that player i has only correct beliefs about
the events (ES)S∈Σi consistently with the γ model. More precisely, player i is endowed of
family of correct beliefs functions (λi,S)S∈Σi where each λi,S :
∏n
i=1∆i → [0, 1] gives the
correct probability that coalition S will eventually form for every given strategy profile m,
that is
λi,S(m) =
∏
h∈S
mh,S ∀S ∈ Σi, |S| ≥ 2
λi,{i}(m) = 1−
∑
S∈Σi,|S|≥2
[∏
h∈S
mh,S
]
Therefore, it is possible to construct the coalition structure beliefs correspondence of player
i, Ci : ∆Ã ∆Π, as follows
Ci(m) =
{
% ∈ ∆Π
∣∣∣∣∣∑
pi3S
%pi = λi,S(m) ∀S ∈ Σi
}
∀m ∈ ∆.
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Hence, an optimistic player i has the following payoff function FOi : ∆→ R defined by
FOi (m) = max
%∈Ci(m)
∑
pi∈Π
%pifi(pi)
and a pessimistic player i has the following payoff function F Pi : ∆→ R defined by
F Pi (m) = min
%∈Ci(m)
∑
pi∈Π
%pifi(pi).
3 Games, contingent beliefs and equilibria
3.1 The model
We consider a finite set on players I = {1, . . . n}; for every player i, Ψi = {ψ1i , . . . , ψk(i)i } is the
(finite) pure strategy set of player i, Ψ =
∏
i∈I Ψi and Ψ−i =
∏
j 6=iΨj. Denote with Xi the set
of mixed strategies of player i and each strategy xi ∈ Xi is a vector xi = (xi(ψi))ψi∈Ψi ∈ Rk(i)+
such that
∑
ψi∈Ψi xi(ψi) = 1. Denote also with X =
∏n
j=1Xj and with X−i =
∏
j 6=iXj.
Differently from the classical literature on games, in this work we do not assume the
existence of a one to one correspondence between strategies and outcomes of a game. Instead,
we denote with Ω ⊆ Rn the set of outcomes of the game, where ωi represents the payoff to
player i when outcome ω is realized. Let P be the set of all probability distributions on
Ω, we consider the general situation in which each player is endowed with a set-valued map
Bi : X Ã P , called beliefs correspondence, which gives to player i the set Bi(x) of subjective
beliefs over outcomes, for every strategy profile x ∈ X. We consider the (extreme) situation
in which players are either pessimistic or optimistic where a player is pessimistic if, in the
presence of ambiguity, emphasizes the lower payoffs while he is optimistic if he emphasizes
the higher ones instead.
More precisely, if we denote with Ei(%) =
∑
ω∈Ω %(ω)ωi, then a pessimistic player has the
pessimistic payoff F Pi : X → R defined by
F Pi (x) = min
%∈Bi(x)
Ei(%) ∀x ∈ X, (1)
while an optimistic player has the optimistic payoff FOi : X → R defined by
FOi (x) = max
%∈Bi(x)
Ei(%) ∀x ∈ X. (2)
Assuming that players are partitioned in optimistic and pessimistic ones, that is, I = O ∪ P
with O ∩ P = ∅; we consider the game
ΓO,P = {I; (Xi)i∈I ; (Bi)i∈I ; (FOi )i∈O, (F Pi )i∈P}.
This game is a classical strategic form game and we call equilibria under beliefs correspon-
dences Bi the classical Nash equilibria of ΓO,P .
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3.2 Equilibria
Aim of this subsection is to provide an existence result for the equilibria of the strategic
form game ΓO,P . This result depend on the properties of the beliefs correspondences, so the
analysis starts by recalling well known definitions and results on set-valued maps which we
use below.
Preliminaries on set-valued maps
Following Aubin and Frankowska (1989)4, recall that if Z and Y are two metric spaces and
F : Z Ã Y a set-valued map, then
i) Lim inf
z→z′
F (z) = {y ∈ Y | limz→z′ d(y, F (z)) = 0}
ii) Lim sup
z→z′
F (z) =
{
y ∈ Y | lim inf
z→z′
d(y, F (z)) = 0
}
iii) Lim inf
z→z′
F (z) ⊆ F (z′) ⊆ Lim sup
z→z′
F (z).
Moreover
Definition 3.1: Given the set valued map F : Z Ã Y , then
i) F is lower semicontinuous in z′ if F (z′) ⊆ Lim inf
z→z′
F (z); that is, F is lower semicontinu-
ous in z′ if for every y ∈ F (z′) and every sequence (zν)ν∈N converging to z′ there exists
a sequence (yν)ν∈N converging to y such that yν ∈ F (zν) for every ν ∈ N. Moreover, F
is lower semicontinuous in Z if it is lower semicontinuous for all z′ in Z.
ii) F is closed in z′ if Lim sup
z→z′
F (z) ⊆ F (z′); that is, F is closed in z′ if for every sequence
(zν)ν∈N converging to z′ and every sequence (yν)ν∈N converging to y such that yν ∈ F (zν)
for every ν ∈ N, it follows that y ∈ F (z′). Moreover, F is closed in Z if it is closed for
all z′ in Z.
iii) F is upper semicontinuous in z′ if for every open set U such that F (z′) ⊆ U there exists
η > 0 such that F (z) ⊆ U for all z ∈ BZ(z′, η) = {ζ ∈ Z |; ||ζ − z′|| < η}. Moreover, F
is upper semicontinuous in Z if it is upper semicontinuous for all z′ in Z.
iv) F is continuous (in the sense of Painleve´-Kuratowski) in z′ if it is lower semicontinuous
and upper semicontinuous in z′.
The following proposition is very useful in this work.
Proposition 3.2: Assume that Z is closed, Y is compact and the set-valued map F : Z Ã Y
has closed values, i.e. F (z) is closed for all z ∈ Z. Then, F is upper semicontinuous in z ∈ Z
if and only if F is closed in z5.
4All the definitions and the propositions we use, together with the proofs can be found in this book.
5Every set valued map in this paper satisfies the assumptions of this proposition. Hence upper semicon-
tinuity and closeness coincide in this work.
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Recall also that
Definition 3.3: Let Z a convex set, then the set valued map F : Z Ã Y is a said to be
concave if
tF (z) + (1− t)F (ẑ) ⊆ F (tz + (1− t)ẑ) ∀ z, ẑ ∈ Z, ∀ t ∈ [0, 1] (3)
while it is convex if
F (tz + (1− t)ẑ) ⊆ tF (z) + (1− t)F (ẑ) ∀ z, ẑ ∈ Z, ∀ t ∈ [0, 1] (4)
Existence theorems
Denote with BROi : X−i Ã Xi and with BRPi : X−i Ã Xi the set valued maps defined by
BROi (x−i) = {xi ∈ Xi | FOi (xi, x−i) = max
xi∈Xi
FOi (xi, x−i)} ∀x−i ∈ X−i (5)
BRPi (x−i) = {xi ∈ Xi | F Pi (xi, x−i) = max
xi∈Xi
F Pi (xi, x−i)} ∀x−i ∈ X−i (6)
and recall that
Definition 3.4: If D ⊆ Rn is a convex set and g : D → R then g is said to be quasi concave
if for every x, y ∈ D and α ∈]0, 1[ it results that f(αx+ (1− α)y) ≥ min{f(x), f(y)}.
Then
Proposition 3.5: Assume that Bi is continuous with not empty compact and convex images
for every x ∈ X and Bi(·, x−i) is concave in Xi for every x−i ∈ X−i, that is
tBi(xi, x−i) + (1− t)Bi(x̂i, x−i) ⊆ Bi(txi + (1− t)x̂i, x−i) ∀x−i ∈ X−i. (7)
Then FOi is continuous in X and F
O
i (·, x−i) is quasi concave in Xi for every x−i ∈ X−i.
Therefore, the set valued map BROi is upper semicontinuous with not empty, closed and
convex images for every x−i ∈ X−i.
Proof. From the assumptions each function FOi is well defined and by applying the Berge
maximum theorem (see also Aubin and Frankowska (1990), Border (1985)), FOi is continuous
on the compact set X and BROi is upper semicontinuous with not empty and closed images
for every x−i ∈ X−i.
Now we prove that FOi (·, x−i) is concave for all x−i ∈ X−i. Let xi and x̂h in Xi, and
consider % ∈ Bi(xi, x−i) and %̂ ∈ Bi(x̂i, x−i) such that FOi (xi, x−i) = Ei(%) and FOi (x̂h, x−i) =
Ei(%̂). If t ∈]0, 1[ then from the assumptions it follows that t% + (1 − t)%̂ ∈ Bi(txi + (1 −
t)x̂i, x−i). Since
Ei(t%+ (1− t)%̂) = tEi(%) + (1− t)Ei(%̂)}
then
FOi (txi + (1− t)x̂i, x−i) = max
%∈Bi(txi+(1−t)x̂i,x−i)
Ei(%) ≥ Ei(t%+ (1− t)%̂) = (8)
tFOi (xi, x−i) + (1− t)FOi (x̂i, x−i). (9)
Therefore FOi (·, x−i) is concave for every x−i ∈ X−i. Then it follows that BROi has convex
images for every x−i ∈ X−i.
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Proposition 3.6: Assume that Bi is continuous with not empty compact and convex images
for every x ∈ X and Bi(·, x−i) is convex in Xi for every x−i ∈ X−i, that is
tBi(xi, x−i) + (1− t)Bi(x̂i, x−i) ⊇ Bi(txi + (1− t)x̂i, x−i) ∀x−i ∈ X−i. (10)
Then F Pi is continuous in X and F
P
i (·, x−i) is quasi concave in Xi for every x−i ∈ X−i.
Therefore, the set valued map BRPi is upper semicontinuous with not empty, closed and
convex images for every x−i ∈ X−i.
Proof. We follow the same steps of the proof of the previous Proposition. From the assump-
tions each function F Pi is well defined and by applying the Berge maximum theorem (see also
Aubin and Frankowska (1990), Border (1985)), F Pi is continuous on the compact set X and
BRPi is upper semicontinuous with not empty and closed images for every x−i ∈ X−i.
Now we prove that F Pi (·, x−i) is concave for all x−i ∈
∏
j 6=iXj. Let xi and x̂h be in
Xi and t ∈ [0, 1]. Let F Pi (txi + (1 − t)x̂i, x−i) = Ei(%∗) with %∗ ∈ Bi(txi + (1 − t)x̂i, x−i).
Then, in light of the assumptions, there exist % ∈ Bi(xi, x−i) and %̂ ∈ Bi(x̂i, x−i) such that
%∗ = t%+ (1− t)%̂; therefore
Ei(%
∗) = tEi(%) + (1− t)Ei(%̂) ≥ t
[
min
%∈Bi(xi,x−i)
Ei(%)
]
+ (1− t)
[
min
%∈Bi(x̂i,x−i)
Ei(%)
]
= tF Pi (xi, x−i) + (1− t)F Pi (x̂i, x−i)
and F Pi (·, x−i) is concave for all x−i. Then it follows that BRPi has convex images for every
x−i ∈ X−i.
From the Nash equilibrium existence theorems (see for instance Rosen (1965), it imme-
diately follows that
Theorem 3.7: Assume that for every player i, Bi is continuous with not empty compact and
convex images for every x ∈ X. If, for every player i ∈ O, Bi(·, x−i) is concave in Xi for
every x−i ∈ X−i and, for every player i ∈ P , Bi(·, x−i) is convex in Xi for every x−i ∈ X−i,
then, the game ΓO,P has at least an equilibrium.
Related concepts
A particular case of beliefs correspondences can be obtained in the classical framework in
which each player i is endowed with a payoff function fi : Ψ→ R and a beliefs correspondence
from strategy profiles to correlated strategies, i.e. Ki : X Ã ∆, where ∆ is the set of
probability distributions on Ψ. In that case, denoting with Ω = {(f1(ψ), . . . , fn(ψ)) |ψ ∈ Ψ}
the set of outcomes, the beliefs correspondence over outcomes Bi : X Ã P is defined by
Bi(x) = {% ∈ P | ∃µ ∈ Ki(x) with %(fi (ψ)) = µ(ψ) ∀ψ ∈ Ψ}.
Note that if Ki(x) = x then the game ΓO,P coincides with the mixed extension of Γ so
that the set of equilibria of ΓO,P coincides with the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria of Γ.
Moreover, recall that
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Definition 3.8 (Klibanoff (1996)): If, for every player i, Bi is a nonempty, closed and convex
subset of probability distributions over Ψ−i, then (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n;B1, . . . , Bn), is an equilibrium
with uncertainty aversion if, for every player i ∈ I,
i) minp∈Bi
∑
ψ∈Ψ fi(ψi, ψ−i)x
∗
i (ψi)p(ψ−i) ≥ minp∈Bi
∑
ψ∈Ψ fi(ψi, ψ−i)xi(ψi)p(ψ−i) for ev-
ery xi ∈ Xi
ii) x∗−i ∈ Bi.
By definition, it follows that if (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n;B1, . . . , Bn), is an equilibrium with uncertainty
aversion, then (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) is an equilibrium under beliefs correspondences (Bi)i∈I , where, for
every player i,
Bi(x) = {% ∈ P | ∃p ∈ Biwith %(fi (ψ)) = xi(ψi)p(ψ−i) ∀ψ ∈ Ψ} ∀x ∈ X. (11)
Conversely, given a family (Bi)i∈I , where Bi is a nonempty, closed and convex subset of prob-
ability distributions over Ψ−i for every i = 1, . . . , n, and a family of beliefs correspondences
(Bi)i∈I , defined by (11) for every player i. If (x∗1, . . . , x∗n) is an equilibrium under beliefs
correspondences (Bi)i∈I , I = P and x∗−i ∈ Bi for every player i, then (x∗1, . . . , x∗n;B1, . . . , Bn)
is an equilibrium with uncertainty aversion.
4 Examples of Beliefs Correspondences
In this section we propose two different kind of beliefs correspondence and investigate whether
they satisfy the requirements of the existence results. In the first model, beliefs to a player
over his opponents’ strategy profiles are given by the correlated equilibria of the game between
the opponents once they have observed player’s action. In the second model, beliefs are
determined by contingent assignment of ambiguity levels on a family of disjoint events on
the set of outcomes.
4.1 Beliefs given by correlated equilibria
The idea underlying the kind of beliefs correspondence investigated in this subsection is
that a player believes his opponents will observe his action before choosing their strategies.
Assuming that the player believes that his opponents will react optimally and in a correlated
way once observed his action then his beliefs are given by the correlated equilibria of the
game between the opponents given the player’s action.
For a given player i, denote with Ji = I \ {i}, then, for every pure strategy ψi ∈ Ψi,
consider the game
G(ψi) = {Ji; (Ψj)j∈Ji ; (gψij )j∈Ji}
where Ψj is the pure strategy set of player j and the payoff function g
ψi
j : Ψ−i → R is the
payoff function of player j which corresponds to the payoff of player j in the game Γ when
player i chooses ψi, i.e., g
ψi
j ((ψ̂h)h∈Ji) = fj(ψ̂1, .., ψ̂i−1, ψi, ψ̂i+1, .., ψ̂n) for every ψ̂−i ∈ Ψ−i.
Now we recall the definition of correlated equilibrium (Aumann (1974, 1987)) for the game
G(ψi). To this purpose we denote with ψ−(i,j) = (ψh)h∈I\{i,j} and with Ψ−(i,j) =
∏
h∈I\{i,j}Ψh
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Definition 4.1 (Aumann): A probability distribution µ on Ψ−i is a correlated equilibrium
for the game G(ψi) if for every player j ∈ Ji and every pure strategy ψ¯j ∈ Ψj,∑
ψ−(i,j)∈Ψ−(i,j)
µ
(
ψ−(i,j)|ψ¯j
)
gψij (ψ¯j, ψ−(i,j)) ≥
∑
ψ−(i,j)∈Ψ−(i,j)
µ
(
ψ−(i,j)|ψ¯j
)
gψij (ψj, ψ−(i,j)) ∀ψj ∈ Ψj.
(12)
where
µ
(
ψ−(i,j)|ψ¯j
)
=
µ
(
ψ¯j, ψ−(i,j)
)∑
ψ˜−(i,j)∈Ψ−(i,j) µ
(
ψ¯j, ψ˜−(i,j)
)
if
∑
ψ˜−(i,j)∈Ψ−(i,j) µ
(
ψ¯j, ψ˜−(i,j)
)
6= 0 and µ (ψ−(i,j)|ψ¯j) = 0 otherwise. Therefore, µ (ψ−(i,j)|ψ¯j)
is player j’s conditional probability of ψ−(i,j) given ψ¯j; that is, the probability that player j
assigns to the strategy profile ψ−(i,j) of his opponents in Ji once the mediator has communi-
cated player j to play ψ¯j. In other words, µ is a correlated equilibrium if the expected payoff
from playing the recommended strategy is no worse than playing any other strategy.
Denote with Ci(ψi) the set of correlated equilibria of the game G(ψi). Then, assume that
Ω = {f(ψ) | ψ ∈ Ψ} and let Bi : X Ã P be the set-valued map defined by
Bi(x) =
∑
ψi∈Ψi
xi(ψi)Ci(ψi) ∀x ∈ X (13)
that is, for every x ∈ X,
% ∈ Bi(x) ⇐⇒ ∀ψi ∈ Ψi ∃µψi ∈ Ci(ψi) such that % =
∑
ψi∈Ψi
xi(ψi)µψi .
We emphasize that this set valued map means that player i believes that the other players
will observe his play and then they will react by choosing a correlated equilibrium.
Lemma 4.2: The set valued map Bi defined in (13) is continuous with not empty convex and
closed values for every x ∈ X. Moreover Bi(·, x−i) is concave and convex for every x−i ∈ X−i.
Proof. For every ψi the set Ci(ψi) of correlated equilibria of the game G(ψi) is not empty
closed and convex (see Aumann (1974, 1987)). Let %′ and %′′ in Bi(x). Hence, for every
strategy ψi there exist correlated equilibria µ
′
ψi
and µ′′ψi of the game G(ψi) such that
%′ =
∑
ψi∈Ψi
xi(ψi)µ
′
ψi
, %′′ =
∑
ψi∈Ψi
xi(ψi)µ
′′
ψi
hence
α%′ + (1− α)%′′ =
∑
ψi∈Ψi
xi(ψi)[αµ
′
ψi
+ (1− α)µ′′ψi ] ∈ Bi(x) ∀α ∈]0, 1[
since each Ci(ψi) is convex. Hence Bi(x) is convex for every x ∈ X.
Now, we show that the set valued map Bi is closed for every x ∈ X. In fact, given a
point x ∈ X, let (xν)ν∈N be a sequence in X converging to x and (%ν)ν∈N be a sequence
converging to % with in %ν ∈ Bi(xν) for every ν ∈ N. Denote with xν = (x1,ν , . . . , xn,ν),
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then %ν =
∑
ψi∈Ψi xi,ν(ψi)µ
ν
ψi
with µνψi ∈ Ci(ψi) for every ψi ∈ Ψi and every ν ∈ N. Since
µνψi → µψi and Ci(ψi) is closed then µψi ∈ Ci(ψi) for every ψi and % ∈ Bi(x). Therefore Bi is
closed in x. Applying the previous arguments at the constant sequence (xν)ν∈N with xν = x
for every ν ∈ N, it follows that Bi(x) is also closed for every x ∈ X. Being P compact and
X closed it follows that Bi is upper semicontinuous in X.
Bi is also lower semicontinuous in every x ∈ X. In fact, given a point x ∈ X, consider
% ∈ Bi(x) and a sequence (xν)ν∈N in X converging to x. Since % =
∑
ψi∈Ψi xi(ψi)µψi with
µψi ∈ Ci(ψi) for every ψi ∈ Ψi, consider %ν =
∑
ψi∈Ψi xi,ν(ψi)µψi for every ν ∈ N. It
immediately follows that %ν → % as ν →∞ which implies that Bi is lower semicontinuous in
x.
Finally, since
Bi(x′i, x−i) =
∑
ψi∈Ψi
x′i(ψi)Ci(ψi), and Bi(x′′i , x−i) =
∑
ψi∈Ψi
x′′i (ψi)Ci(ψi)
then, for every α ∈]0, 1[ it follows that
Bi(αx′i + (1− α)x′′i , x−i) =
∑
ψi∈Ψi
[αx′i + (1− α)x′′i ]Ci(ψi) =
α
[∑
ψi∈Ψi
x′i(ψi)Ci(ψi)
]
+ (1− α)
[∑
ψi∈Ψi
x′′i (ψi)Ci(ψi)
]
= αBi(x′i, x−i) + (1− α)Bi(x′′i , x−i)
which implies that Bi(·, x−i) is concave and convex for every x−i ∈ X−i.
Remark 4.3: Note that an analogous construction of a beliefs correspondence involving the
set of Nash equilibria Ni(ψi) of the game G(ψi) instead of the set of correlated equilibria
Ci(ψi) does not guarantee that all the properties required for the existence of the equilibria
of the game ΓO,P are satisfied. More precisely, since the set of Nash equilibria is not always
convex6, each Ni(ψi) is not necessarily convex and hence the set-valued map Ni : X Ã P
defined by
Ni(x) =
∑
ψi∈Ψi
xi(ψi)Ni(ψi) ∀x ∈ X
does not have convex values in general.
Remark 4.4: Given the beliefs correspondence Bi(·) defined by (13), we can consider a
generalization of the beliefs correspondence considered in the stag hunt game: player i has a
fixed set of ambiguous beliefs Di but he believes that with probability ε his opponents will
observe his action and will react optimally in a correlated way. In fact, let Di be a convex
and closed set of probability distributions over Ψ−i and let ε > 0, it is possible to consider
the beliefs correspondence Di : X Ã P defined by
Di(x) =
∑
ψi∈Ψi
xi(ψi)[(1− ε)Di + εCi(ψi)] ∀x ∈ X.
Following the same steps in the proof of Lemma 4.2, it results that Di is continuous with
not empty convex and closed values for every x ∈ X and Di(·, x−i) is concave and convex for
every x−i ∈ X−i.
6Indeed, examples show that usually the set of Nash equilibria is not convex.
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4.2 Upper bounds for beliefs
We consider now the case in which the correspondences Bi are determined by an assignment
of upper levels for the probabilities of a family of disjoint events in Ω. This example provides
a generalization of the beliefs correspondences in the ambiguous formation model previously
presented7.
In particular, given a player i, we assume there exist a family of subsets of Ω, denoted
with Fi such that
∪F∈FiF = Ω; E ,F ∈ Fi and E 6= F =⇒ E ∩ F = ∅
and a family of functions (gi,F)F∈Fi such that gi,F : X → [0, 1]. Each gi,F(x) gives the
maximal probability of the event F to player i given the mixed strategy profile x. Hence,
the following consistency condition should be satisfied∑
F∈Fi
gi,F(x) ≥ 1 ∀x ∈ X.
The set-valued map of feasible beliefs to player i Bi is therefore given by
Bi(x) =
{
% ∈ P |
∑
ξ∈F
%(ξ) ≤ gi,F(x) ∀F ∈ Fi
}
(14)
So we have that
Theorem 4.5: If the function gi is continuous on X then the set valued map Bi defined by
(14) is upper and lower semicontinuous with not empty compact and closed images.
Proof. By definition Bi(x) is compact and convex. Now we prove that the graph of Bi that
is
Graph(Bi) = {(x, %) ∈ X × P | % ∈ Bi(x)} (15)
is closed. In fact, let {(xν , %ν)}ν be a sequence converging to (x, %) with (xν , %ν) ∈ Graph(Bi)
for all ν. Obviously, from compactness, x ∈ X and % ∈ P . Being ∑ξ∈F %ν(ξ) ≤ gi,F(xν) for
all ν ∈ N, from continuity of gi,F for all F ∈ F it follows that
∑
ξ∈F %(ξ) ≤ gi,F(x) for all
F ∈ F and hence % ∈ Bi(x). Hence Bi has closed graph and compact images so it is upper
semicontinuous.
Now we show that Bi is lower semicontinuous in X, that is, for every x ∈ X, % ∈ Bi(x)
and xν → x, there exists %ν → % with %ν ∈ Bi(xν) for all ν ∈ N. In fact, given the distribution
% and for every ξ ∈ Ω let Fξ the unique element of Fi containing ξ. Denote with P% (Fξ) the
probability of the event Fξ given the distribution % (i.e. P% (Fξ) =
∑
ξ̂∈Fξ %(ξ̂) ) and with
P% (ξ|Fξ) the conditional probability of ξ given Fξ (set P% (ξ|Fξ) = 0 if P% (Fξ)), then we have
%(ξ) = P% (Fξ) [P% (ξ|Fξ)] .
Denote with F 0i = {F ∈ Fi | P% (F) = 0}, F 1i = {F ∈ Fi \ F 0i | P% (F) = gi,F(x)}
and with F 2i = {F ∈ Fi \ F 0i | P% (F) < gi,F(x)}. From the total probability theorem
7In De Marco and Romaniello (2010;a,b) ambiguity derives from assignments of probabilities on disjoint
events.
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(i.e.
∑
F∈F P% (F) = 1) it follows that the vector (P% (F))F∈F2i is a solution of the following
equation ∑
F∈F2i
YF = H(x) (16)
where H(x) = 1 −∑F∈F1i gi,F(x). From the continuity of each function gi,F it immediately
follows that the set valued map of the solutions of the system (16), x Ã S(x), is lower
semicontinuous in X. This implies that, given the sequence xν → x, there exists a sequence
(Y ν)ν (where Y
ν = (Y νF )F∈F2i )) which converges to (P% (F))F∈F2i . Hence, define for every
ν ∈ N
Pν% (F) =

0 if F ∈ F 0i
gi,F(xν) if F ∈ F 1i
Y νF if F ∈ F 2i
Note that, by construction,
∑
F∈F Pν% (F) = 1 for every ν ∈ N. Define also
%ν(ξ) = Pν% (Fξ) [P% (ξ|Fξ)] ∀ξ ∈ X,
where Fξ is the unique set inFi containing ξ; then, from the continuity of each gi,F , it follows
that %ν(ξ)→ %(ξ) as xν → x. Moreover, it also follows that
∑
ξ∈X %ν(ξ) = 1; in fact∑
ξ∈X
%ν(ξ) =
∑
F∈Fi\F0i
[∑
ξ∈F
%ν(ξ)
]
=
∑
F∈Fi\F0i
∑
ξ∈F
Pν% (F) [P% (ξ|F)] =
∑
F∈Fi\F0i
Pν% (F)
[∑
ξ∈F
P% (ξ|F)
]
= 1
since, for every F ∈ Fi\F 0i , it results that
∑
ξ∈F P% (ξ|F) = 1. So (%ν(ξ))ξ∈Ω is a probability
distribution on Ω.
Finally, (%ν(ξ))ξ∈Ω satisfies the consistency constraints in (14). In fact it immediately
follows that ∑
ξ∈F
%ν(ξ) ≤ gi,F(xν) ∀F ∈ F 1i ∪F 0i
Now, let F ∈ F 2i , then
∑
ξ∈F
%ν(ξ) =
∑
ξ∈F
Y νF [P% (ξ|F)] = Y νF
[∑
ξ∈F
P% (ξ|F)
]
= Y νF .
Since
lim
ν→∞
Y νF = P%(F) < gi,F(x) = lim
ν→∞
gi,F(xν)
then there exist ν̂ such that, for all ν ≥ ν̂ it results that∑
ξ∈F
%ν(ξ) = Y
ν
F < gi,F(xν).
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So, by redefining %ν for ν < ν̂, it follows that %ν ∈ Bi(xν) for all ν ∈ N and the assertion
follows.
Theorem 4.6: If the function gi(·, x−i) is concave in Xi for every x−i ∈ X−i then the set-
valued map Bi(·, x−i) is concave for every x−i ∈ X−i, that is
Bi(txi + (1− t)x̂i, x−i) ⊇ Bi(xi, x−i) + (1− t)Bi(x̂i, x−i) ∀x−i ∈ X−i (17)
Proof. Let % ∈ Bi(xi, x−i) and %˜ ∈ Bi(x˜i, x−i) and t ∈]0, 1[. Obviously t% + (1 − t)%̂ ∈ P ;
moroever, by defition follows that∑
ξ∈F
%(ξ) ≤ gi,F(xi, x−i) and
∑
ξ∈F
%̂(ξ) ≤ gi,F(x̂i, x−i) ∀F ∈ Fi.
Hence∑
ξ∈F
[t%(ξ)+(1−t)%̂(ξ)] ≤ tgi,F(xi, x−i)+(1−t)gi,F(x̂i, x−i) ≤ gi,F(txi+(1−t)x̂i, x−i) ∀F ∈ Fi,
which implies that t%+ (1− t)%̂ ∈ Bi(txi + (1− t)x̂i, x−i) and
tBi(xi, x−i) + (1− t)Bi(x̂i, x−i) ⊆ Bi(txi + (1− t)x̂i, x−i) ∀x−i ∈ X−i.
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